which are not explainable solely by talking about the brain, because most people don't know about them, and because I believe they are philosophically important. (They appear mostly in chapters 2, 3 and 10.) More importantly, as I explain on page 30, the fact that these brain processes are necessary for conscious experience does not mean that they are identical to conscious experience. Mind-Brain Identity requires that those brain processes be both necessary and sufficient. It is necessary for your car to have spark plugs in order for you to drive it. But that doesn't mean the spark plugs are identical to the car, because owning a set of spark plugs is not sufficient to enable you to drive to work. So the question remains: Why is brain activity identical to consciousness, and not just necessary for it? At what point does the intricacy become both necessary and sufficient, and why should we automatically assume that all of this intricacy will take place in the skull?
When most people get to this stage in the argument, they usually reply, as McCarthy did, that, even if we can't answer that question, we still need to make a distinction between Mind and World for pragmatic reasons. She, Dewey and I all agree that there is value in what McCarthy calls the "analytic distinctions of self and world." That is why I say this on page 104 of NBG: "To say that the mind emerges from the brain-body-world nexus does not mean that there is no world, only a mind. The line between the self and the world must always be drawn somewhere. . . . That is what it means to live in a world." I do not identify the mind with the entire brain-body-world nexus, as McCarthy claims. I think what prompted her to attribute this position to me was the qualifiers that were removed from the above quote. I believe that the line between the self and world must be drawn somewhere at any given moment. But this does not necessarily imply that there is a single place that the line can be drawn for all conscious creatures, or for a single conscious creature throughout its history. A great deal of useful scientific work can be done by drawing the line at the skull, but the scientific work I describe in my book needs to draw the line in a variety of other places. I think the best way to account for both mainstream neuroscience and this other, more problematic work is to see the boundary between self and world as flexible. That is why I feel the mind is best described as a "behavioral field" rather than as an organ in the skull.
There is nothing mystical about this claim. Gravitational fields are every bit as physical as falling apples, but our best science cannot fully explain the behavior of falling apples without talking about fluctuations with a field. I am suggesting that if our psychology ever becomes as sophisticated as our physics, we might end up describing minds as similarly fluctuating behavioral fields. We can ignore these fluctuations a great deal of the time. The assumption that the mind is nothing but an organ in the skull will probably always be accurate enough for a variety of scientific research, just as Einsteinian physics is not necessary for most engineering jobs. But I believe that the future of cognitive science, and the resolution of certain philosophical puzzles, will require a subtler and initially more counterintuitive theory.
I could (and will) quibble about some of McCarthy's other criticisms. She implies that I am not aware that Searle's "Background" is a set of non-intentional capacities, although I devote pages 141-148 to explaining why Searle disagrees with both Dewey and me on this issue. She then claims that I have no right to use my amended version of Searle's concept because he is an internalist and I am an externalist, but gives no support for this. McCarthy also accuses me of having "limited acquaintance with requisite scientific knowledge," an accusation that is probably true of me and of anyone else who has written a multidisciplinary work of this sort. However, she does not cite a single factual error in support of this accusation. If she knows of some, I would like to hear about them. She also says that my criticism of Searle's distinction between intrinsic and observer-relative properties rests entirely on a few comments about the nature of entropy and energy, although the argument is actually three pages long, and makes several other points. Finally, Searle's distinction between brute and institutional facts is not limited to questions of syntax, as she claims, but includes all properties that presuppose the existence of purpose, including biological properties like being a lung.
However, my intention has been not so much to criticize Professor McCarthy's criticism as to make my own position clearer. I appreciate her willingness to question and challenge what is still very much a theory in progress, and I hope my replies will make it easier for future development and understanding of these new ideas.
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